Meta-analogical transfer (i.e., transfer due to forming an analogy between analogies) was demonstrated in four experiments. Results suggested that the basis of meta-analogical transfer was transfer of predicate mappings (mappings of the concepts used to represent analogies) between separate episodes of analogical reasoning. Episodes of letter-string analogy problem solving of the form, "If abc was changed into abd, how would you change kji in the same way?" were used. These analogy problems are well-constrained and have multiple plausible solutions. In Experiment 1 participants generated solutions in two separate analogical reasoning episodes. Order of presentation effects provided evidence of meta-analogical transfer based on transfer of predicate mappings (e.g., "successor to successor"). Experiments 2a and 2b reinforced these findings, demonstrating transfer when mappings for the first analogy were directly manipulated by having participants justify an answer to the first analogy. Experiment 3 demonstrated that a mapping of non-identical predicates ("successor to predecessor") can also be transferred. Meta-Analogical Transfer: Transfer between Episodes of Analogical Reasoning Analogical reasoning is based on transferring information from a known situation (the source domain) to a situation requiring explaining (the target domain) by finding a similar system of relations that holds among the elements in each situation (Vosnaidou & Ortony, 1989) . Such analogical reasoning has been suggested to underlie human thinking within domains as diverse as science (Oppenheimer, 1956 ), management (Isenberg, 1986), poetry (Holyoak, 1982, football recruiting, international relations (Gilovich, 1981) , military command, chess, and fire fighting (Klein, 1986 The ability of people to form abstract analogies is impressive (Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Gick & Holyoak, 1980 , 1983 Keane, 1988 
structure that normally applies in one domain can be applied in another domain. That is, the relations (which are represented by predicates) can be mapped between the domains.
The emphasis on predicate mappings in models of analogical reasoning such as those of Gentner (1983) and Holyoak and Thagard (1989) accounts for our ability to form analogies when little semantic similarity exists between the source and target domains. In these models the mapping is assumed to be constrained by a pressure to maintain structural consistency. This constraint requires that mapped elements should play similar roles in both the source and target domains, and tend to map to only a single element in the other domain. To meet this requirement, a set of mutually constraining, coherent mappings are formed. As Holyoak and Thagard (1989, p. 295) state: "At the core of analogical thinking lies the process of mapping: the construction of orderly correspondences between elements of a source analog and those of a target." The flexibility of predicate mappings -allowing mappings of predicates with no semantic similarity -accounts for the power of analogical reasoning. In Genter's and Holyoak and Thagard's theories the analogy is a set of mappings. Thus if meta-analogical transfer occurs, these theories imply that the predicate mappings formed in the first analogical reasoning episode will be transferred to the second.
There is little direct evidence concerning whether predicate mappings could be the basis for metaanalogical transfer. Some results obtained by Novick and Holyoak (1991) could be interpreted as evidence against the necessity of predicate mappings for analogical reasoning. Novick and Holyoak told participants the predicate mappings between the source and the target. They found that such a predicate-mapping hint resulted in no improvement in transfer of the analogical solution, when compared to a hint that simply referred back to the appropriate problem. Both types of hints were better than no hint, but worse than an object-mapping hint (e.g., saying that the number 5 in one problem maps to the number 6 in the new problem). However, this result may demonstrate the usefulness of object mappings, rather than that predicate mappings are irrelevant. Furthermore, if people derive predicate mappings spontaneously, then that would obviate their usefulness as hints.
The present paper proposes that predicate mappings may be transferred between analogies, providing the basis for transfer effects between episodes of analogical reasoning. To investigate the existence of meta-analogical transfer effects it was necessary to examine people's performance when involved in multiple episodes of analogical reasoning (each in itself requiring a mapping of source to target). The aims of the experiments reported here were to investigate whether meta-analogical transfer occurs and, if so, to test whether predicate mapping provide the basis of such transfer.
Letter-String Analogy Problems
A constrained task was used to investigate predicate mappings and their role in transfer: letter-string analogy problems of the type modeled in the computer program Copycat (Hofstadter, 1985; Hofstadter & Mitchell, 1994; Mitchell, 1993) . Copycat is a computer program that creates analogical inferences in a single domain, a micro-world consisting of the 26 letters of the alphabet and associated concepts. The program solves analogies such as: "Given that abc changes to abd, how would you change kji in the same way?" Or " ... how would you change mrrjjj in the same way?" (Note that the convention in this paper will be to present the string to be changed in bold-face, while strings that are possible answers will be in italics.) Mitchell (1993, p. 16) claimed that analogy-making can be broadly characterized as distilling the essence of one situation and adapting it via "conceptual slippage"
(essentially, mapping of non-identical predicates) to fit another situation. The letter-string analogies isolate what Mitchell and Hofstadter consider to be the key to such analogy making for both people and machines: constructing a coherently structured representation of a situation at an appropriate level of abstraction.
Examples of Letter-String Problems
Copycat is intended to be one instantiation of a theory of both human and m achine analogical reasoning (see Hofstadter, 1995; Mitchell, 1993) ; the way in which Copycat solves letter-string analogies provided the basis for initial hypotheses about how people might solve these analogies.
Consider the analogy problem abc:abd::kji:? (this notation signifies the problem of how to change the string kji in the same way as abc is changed into abd, which will be referred to as the "kji analogy").
This analogy appears to have at least three reasonable answers: kjj, kjh, and lji. When given this analogy, these were the three most common answers that Copycat produced. Each answer depends on building a different representation of the analogy. In order to derive the kjj answer it is necessary to form a representation in which c (last element of the string abc) is mapped to i (last element of the string kji) and the successor relationship between c and d is mapped to a successor relationship between i and j. Thus this mapping is based on the predicate mapping of "successor to successor". To produce the kjh answer, however, requires representing the fact that the abc string is a sequence (ascending) and so is the kji string (a descending sequence). Thus, b is the successor of a and c is the successor of b, as well as j being the predecessor of k and i being the predecessor of j. These successor relationships in the abc string are then mapped to the predecessor relationships in the kji string. To maintain consistency, the predicate mapping of "successor to predecessor" is made, allowing the successor relationship between c and d to map to the predecessor relationship between i and h. Thus the kjh answer is based on the predicate mapping of "successor to predecessor", as well as a predicate mapping of "sequence to sequence". Similarly, to generate the lji answer the "sequence to sequence" mapping is still made between the abc and kji letter-strings, but now the predicate mapping of "right to left" is made. The "successor to successor" predicate mapping can then be used, resulting in the successor relation between c and d mapping to another successor relation, that between k and l.
When Copycat is given the analogy problem abc:abd::mrrjjj:? (which will be referred to as the "mrrjjj analogy"), it produces two common answers, namely mrrjjk and mrrkkk. Both answers involve the "successor to successor" mapping, equating the successor relationship between the c and d in abc:abd to the successor relationship between j and k. The two answers differ in the underlying representation of the analogy: Either the string mrrjjj represents a set of six letters and the relation of last letter (c) is mapped to last letter (j), or the mrrjjj string is represented as three groups (m, rr, and jjj) and the relation of last letter (c) is mapped to last group (jjj).
Possible representations of the two analogies are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 . Figure 1 shows a representation of the kjh answer to the kji analogy. As can be seen, each string has an internal structure made up of predicates, which map to the predicates of the string in the other half of the analogy. The "successor" predicate links from left-to-right in abc:abd map to the "predecessor" predicate links from left-to-right in kji:kjh. Therefore, a mapping linking predicates (i.e., "successor to predecessor") can link the predicates in the representation of the abc:abd strings to every predicate in the representation of the kji:kjh strings. In contrast, little structure can be built for the mrrjjj analogy. Figure 2 shows a representation of the mrrkkk answer to the mrrjjj analogy. As can be seen, little internal structure can be formed for the mrrkkk answer, as no predicates link its components.
Consequently, few predicate mappings can be formed between the abc:abd and mrrjjj:mrrkkk parts of the analogy.
Letter-String Analogies as a Task for Studying Meta-Analogies
On the surface, letter-string analogies resemble four-term "proportional" analogies of the form A:B::C:?? (e.g., Red is to Stop, as Green is to ??), which have been used extensively to study analogical reasoning (for a review see Sternberg, 1977) . They thus differ from the types of analogies that have been used in many studies of analogical reasoning as it occurs in the context of problem solving (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980 , 1983 . Such work investigates analogical transfer of the solution of an old problem to a new problem via the formation of an analogy between the two problems, even when the new problem could in principle be solved without drawing an analogy to the first problem (e.g., the radiation problem of Duncker, 1945; see Gick & Holyoak, 1980 , 1983 . In such problem-solving tasks the reasoning may or may not be analogical.
In four-term proportional analogies, on the other hand, the problem fundamentally is an analogy, so analogical reasoning almost certainly will be used to find a solution. As Gick and Holyoak (1983) pointed out, four-term analogies obviate the need for people to spontaneously notice that an analogy could be formed, which is a prerequisite for successful transfer to the new problem. Consequently, four-term analogies can only be used to investigate the types of mappings people form in analogical transfer, not the conditions under which analogical transfer will occur at all. But once people realize that an analogy can be formed, the nature of the analogical reasoning used to solve a problem should follow the same principles, whatever the type of problem. As Gentner (1983) pointed out, the four-term analogy "3:6::2:4" relies on the fact that the relationship between 3 and 6 is the same as relationship between 2 and 4. The same predicate − "twice as great as" − applies to both. Structural consistency holds between the two situations (i.e., 3:6 and 2:4), just as it should for any analogy according to the theories of Gentner (1983) and Holyoak and Thagard (1989) .
For investigating meta-analogies it is unimportant whether the analogical transfer used to form the analogy in the first episode of analogical reasoning was spontaneous; rather, the issue is whether the mappings formed in the first episode can be meta-analogically transferred to the second episode.
Failure to solve each episode by using an analogy would rule out meta-analogical transfer of mappings, which makes it desirable to maximize the probability of participants solving each episode by analogy.
Four-term analogies are therefore well-suited for investigating meta-analogies.
Four-term analogies can be more difficult than "Red:Stop::Green:?". Letter-string analogy problems are quite complex because they can have a large amount of internal structure that can be represented as propositions (e.g., successor [C, D] ). Further, the structure can have competing interpretations (e.g., should the kji string be represented as an alphabetic sequence, or just a spatial ordering of unrelated letters?), leading to different answers. It is the mapping formed between the predicates describing the internal structures of each string that is critical to producing any coherent answer to these analogies (as is the case for all types of analogies).
There are several complementary arguments for using letter-string analogies experimentally. First, they are truly ambiguous, in that there is no externally validated correct answer. Different answers will reflect different representations. The lack of an objectively correct answer may allow more subtle transfer effects to be observed than when transfer is determined simply by whether a person produces the "correct" solution. Second, despite the ambiguity and artificiality of letter-string analogies, Mitchell (1993) showed that people can produce satisfying answers. Third, solving letter-string analogies requires the construction of a set of predicate mappings, which allows the nature of such mappings to be investigated, as well as their possible transfer between different analogical reasoning episodes. Fourth, these analogies have complex internal structure, so that the predicate mappings formed should usually be at least at the level of relational mappings. Fifth, the clarity of the mappings that underlie most answers makes letter-string analogies a good task with which to investigate transfer of predicate mappings between episodes.
For these reasons, letter-string analogies appear to be useful for addressing the questions raised earlier about analogy: Does meta-analogical transfer occur? If so, can the predicate mappings formed in one episode of analogical reasoning be transferred to new episodes of analogical reasoning? If metaanalogical transfer causes predicate mappings to be transferred, then when peoples are involved in consecutive episodes of analogical reasoning, the mappings formed during the first episode should be more likely to be repeated and form the basis of the analogy in the second episode. The following experiments tested these ideas by presenting participants with multiple episodes of letter-string analogy problem-solving. Transfer was investigated by altering the nature of the first episode and observing the effects on the second episode.
Experiment 1
To investigate meta-analogies, in Experiment 1 participants were presented with two episodes of analogical reasoning. In one episode they solved the kji analogy problem, stated as: "Suppose that the letter string abc was changed to abd; how would you change the letter string kji in the same way?" The other episode presented them with the mrrjjj analogy, stated in the same way but with mrrjjj as the string to be changed. The kji and mrrjjj analogies were chosen because they are not isomorphic and because no single answer dominated the responses produced by Copycat; thus they are ambiguous in that different predicate mappings yield different answers. This ambiguity should make these analogies sensitive to transfer effects, as previous analogical reasoning episodes could bias the use of the different representations.
For the kji analogy there should be three common answers: kjh, kjj, and lji. Each of these answers reflect different predicate mappings. As discussed previously, the kjh answer should be based on the mappings of "successor to predecessor" and "sequence to sequence"; the kjj answer should be based on mapping "successor to successor"; and the lji answer should be based on the mappings of "left to right" and "sequence to sequence". Little structure can be built to represent the mrrjjj analogy, so the most common answers should be mrrjjk and mrrkkk, both of which are the result of the predicate mapping "successor to successor". These two different answers could result from constructing different representations of the problem with regard to what constitutes the "last element": either the last letter or last group of letters.
Giving participants both analogies and manipulating the order of presentation should affect solutions to the second episode of analogical reasoning if meta-analogical transfer occurs. Approximately half the participants received the kji analogy first and half received the mrrjjj analogy first, after which each participant received the other analogy problem. If the predicate mapping of "successor to successor" is often formed when solving the mrrjjj analogy, and it can be transferred, then there should be a clear order effect on the kji analogy. When the kji analogy is solved after the mrrjjj analogy, the kjj answer to the kji analogy should be more common than when the kji analogy is solved first, and the alternative mapping "successor to predecessor" required by the kjh answer should become less common. It is unlikely that such straightforward order effects could be observed from the kji analogy to the mrrjjj analogy, as most plausible answers to the mrrjjj analogy appear to involve the predicate mapping of "successor to successor;" thus it was not possible to predict a priori what should be transferred from the mrrjjj analogy.
Method
Participants. A total of 140 participants from the introductory psychology subject pool at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) attempted the analogy problems.
Procedure. Either during or after participating in another experiment, participants were given a twopage booklet. On one page was written, "Suppose that the letter string abc was changed to abd; how would you change the letter string kji in the same way?" The same question was written on the other page, but with the string "mrrjjj" substituted for "kji". For half the participants the kji analogy appeared first and for the other half the mrrjjj analogy appeared first. For each analogy participants were given as long as they wanted to complete the task. Participants were also instructed that if they wrote down more than one answer they were to circle the one they thought the best. At the bottom of the first page participants were instructed not to turn the page until they had completed the problem and that they were not to turn back to the first page. These instructions were intended to discourage participants from attempting the second analogy before completing the first.
Results and Discussion
Only the answer that participants indicated was the best was recorded. Some participants wrote down additional solutions, but these were not analyzed. Participants who did not write down additional solutions may have considered other solutions, but the instructions did not demand that participants produce more than one answer. As participants who chose to write down additional answers may constitute a biased sample, it would be hard to draw conclusions from an analysis of additional answers.
Sixty-six participants solved the kji analogy first and 74 solved the mrrjjj analogy first. Table 1 reports the proportion of participants generating the most common responses to the kji analogy, when the analogy was solved first or second. Twenty different answers were generated, so for reasons of space, all responses produced by two or fewer participants (across both conditions) are grouped together into the category 'other'. A record of all responses is presented in the Appendix. Table 1 about here
If meta-analogical transfer occurs from one episode to the next, the distribution of answers to the kji analogy problem should be affected by the order in which the two analogies were presented. Strong order effects were found by comparing the frequencies of responses to the same analogy when solved second instead of first. As Table 1 shows, for the kji analogy the most common answer, kjh, became less common, X 2 (1) = 11.34, p < .001 (an alpha level of .05 is used throughout this paper), when the analogy was solved second. The kjj answer became the most common answer when the kji analogy was solved second, and it was more frequently generated than when the kji analogy was solved first, X 2 (1) = 19.67, p < .0005. This finding supports the prediction that the use of a "successor to successor" mapping, necessary for the kjj answer, will be used more often after the mrrjjj analogy is solved (an analogy which should require the "successor to successor" mapping), while the "successor to predecessor" mapping required for the kjh answer becomes less common. Table 2 reports the frequency of responses to the mrrjjj analogy when an answer to the mrrjjj analogy was generated first or second. Again, because participants generated a total of forty-seven different answers, all responses produced by only two or fewer participants (across both conditions)
were included in the category 'other', as were cases in which no solution was given. A record of all responses can be found in the Appendix. Table 2 about here
As was the case for the kji analogy, if meta-analogical transfer occurs to the mrrjjj analogy, then the distribution of answers to the mrrjjj analogy should vary depending on the order of presentation of the two analogies. For the mrrjjj analogy the most common answer, mrrkkk, was generated less often when the mrrjjj analogy was solved second, X 2 (1) = 13.71, p < .0005. The second most common answer, mrrjjk, was also generated less often, but not significantly so, X 2 (1) = 1.83, p > .10. This decline in simple application of the predicate mapping "successor to successor" was consistent with the fact that 36% of the participants solving the mrrjjj analogy second had just solved the kji analogy with the answer kjh, which requires the mapping of "successor to predecessor."
When the mrrjjj analogy was solved second a greater variety of answers to this analogy was generated. A total of 21 different solutions were generated by participants solving the mrrjjj analogy first, but 33 different solutions were generated when this analogy was solved second. This greater variety was reflected in a significant increase in the number of participants in the 'other' category, X 2 (1) = 26.51, p < .0005. ('Other' solutions are those produced by two or fewer participants, or when no solution is given.) This order effect suggested that transfer also occurred from the kji analogy to the mrrjjj analogy, but that this transfer was less likely to conform to a single pattern. This finding contrasts with the transfer found to the kji analogy from the mrrjjj analogy, which was highly uniform. If participants build the types of representations postulated in the Introduction, then it should be hard to fit the representation of their answer to the kji analogy to the mrrjjj analogy. If participants tried to make the mappings for the kji analogy fit the mrrjjj analogy when there was no simple way to do so, this could explain the greater variety of answers to the mrrjjj analogy when it was solved second. A clear example of participants trying to fit their mappings for the kji analogy to the mrrjjj analogy was provided by the six participants who generated answers based on the mapping of "successor to predecessor", mrriii (4 participants) and mrrjji (2 participants), answers never produced except when the mrrjjj analogy was solved second. All except one of these six participants had previously given the kjh answer to the kji analogy, an answer requiring a "successor to predecessor" mapping. Only one participant who solved the mrrjjj analogy first produced an answer that might be based on a "successor to predecessor" mapping (mqqjjj). In contrast to the difficulty of transferring from the kji analogy, participants who solved the mrrjjj analogy first appear to have encountered relatively little difficulty in transferring the mappings formed to represent the mrrjjj analogy to the kji analogy, which may account for why there was no increase in the generation of 'other' answers to the kji analogy when it was solved
second.
An important aspect of the results was that the meta-analogical transfer appeared to be asymmetrical in that there was clearer evidence of transfer from the mrrjjj analogy to the kji analogy than vice versa.
If transfer between the two analogies was symmetrical, then for any given pair of answers to the two analogies (e.g., the kjj answer to the kji analogy and the mrrkkk answer to the mrrjjj problem), then the order of presentation should not affect the proportion of participants producing a member of this pair as their solution to the second analogy, after producing the other member of the pair as their answer to the first analogy. For example, the proportion of participants who gave the mrrkkk answer to the second analogy (the mrrjjj analogy in this case) after giving the kjj answer to the first analogy (the kji analogy), should equal the proportion of participants who gave the kjj answer to their second analogy after they had produced the mrrkkk answer to their first analogy.
An examination of common pairs of answer revealed that the above criteria was violated, suggesting that asymmetry of transfer occurred. Of the 34 participants who produced mrrkkk when solving the mrrjjj analogy first, 23 subsequently answered kjj to the kji analogy. However, of the 14 participants answering kjj when they were given the kji analogy first, only two then answered mrrkkk. These two proportions (.68 vs. .14) were significantly different by a test of the association of which analogy was solved first with the answer to the second analogy (i.e., whether the second answer was a member of the pair), given that a member of this pair was generated as the answer to the first analogy, X 2 (1) = 11.3, p < .001. Similarly, of the 11 participants answering mrrjjk to the mrrjjj analogy first, 10 subsequently answered kjj to the kji analogy, but of the 14 answering kjj when the kji analogy was first only three later gave mrrjjk as their answer to the mrrjjj analogy. Again, these proportions (.91 vs.
.21) were significantly different, X 2 (1) = 11.91, p < .001, thus if a member of the kjj/mrrjjk pair was generated as the answer to the first analogy, which analogy problem had been solved affected the likelihood that the second member of the pair would be generated. Crosstables for all participants' responses to the two analogies for each analogy order are given in the Appendix. This asymmetry is especially surprising for transfer from the kjj answer to the kji analogy as it would appear that this answer is based on an idea that can easily be applied to the mrrjjj analogy: simply change the last element (however one defined it) to its successor. The observed asymmetry suggests that the representation of the kjj answer may involve more than the "successor to successor" mapping.
The asymmetry effects strongly supported the claim that some type of transfer is occurring.
Participants did not simply answer in a certain way because they have a propensity to favor "successor"
answers; otherwise, the order in which they received the analogies would not have changed the frequency of pairs of answers such as kjj/mrrjjk. The asymmetries further suggested that participants represent and transfer more than the change to be made to one letter. They may map the concept that the letters abc are a sequence to the concept that the letters kji are also a sequence, and subsequently try to use this predicate mapping in forming their representation of the mrrjjj analogy; however, there is no easy way to apply this "sequence to sequence" mapping to the mrrjjj analogy.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that people can produce coherent answers to letter-string analogy problems, and that the ambiguity of these analogies leads people to generate a variety of answers that reflect different predicate mappings. More importantly, meta-analogical transfer was demonstrated: the order of presentation of episodes of analogical reasoning affected the solution of the episodes. The results supported the claim that predicate mappings were formed during analogical reasoning episodes, and that these mappings were the medium of meta-analogical transfer between analogical reasoning episodes. The way in which the first episode of analogical reasoning was solved systematically affected the second episode. The clearest example of transfer of predicate mappings was the finding that an answer to the kji analogy requiring the "successor to successor" mapping (kjj) became more common after solving the mrrjjj analogy (an analogy that promotes such a mapping), while an answer requiring the "successor to predecessor" mapping (kjh) became rarer.
An alternative basis of transfer between episodes could be transfer of a simple rule, for example, "change last element into its successor." However, it is difficult for transfer of such a simple rule alone to explain the asymmetry of the transfer results. Almost every participant who generated mrrjjk as their answer when they solved the mrrjjj analogy first, subsequently produced kjj as their answer to the kji analogy, which would appear to be simple transfer of a rule. But few participants who generated kjj as their answer when they solved the kji analogy first subsequently generated mrrjjk as an answer to the mrrjjj analogy, even though mrrjjk would appear to be a straightforward application of the rule "change last into successor". It is even harder for a rule-based explanation to account for the transfer effects from the kji analogy to the mrrjjj analogy. If the result of generating an answer to the kji analogy when it is solved first is a simple rule, such as "change last into predecessor" (for the kjh answer), then more people would be expected to apply such rules to the mrrjjj analogy than did so. Furthermore, usually if a rule cannot be applied it has no effect; thus participants who solved the mrrjjj analogy second should have been unaffected by the first analogy if they could not apply the rule derived from the first analogy.
But instead participants generated an increased variety of answers, indicating that something was still being transferred even when the rule did not fit.
Experiment 2a
Experiment 1 clearly demonstrated an effect of the order in which the analogy problems were solved.
Further, there appeared to be a systematic relationship between how participants solved their first analogy and how they solved their second analogy. These results suggest that through meta-analogical transfer, specific mappings are transferred from one analogy problem to a new one. However, there may be alternative explanations for the apparent relationship. In Experiment 1, any attempt to relate a participant's answer in the first episode of analogical reasoning to his or her answers in the second episode is vulnerable to the criticism that how participants solved the first analogy was not constrained.
This lack of control of the mappings formed in the first episode may introduce unknown biases. For example, the most dramatic order effect in Experiment 1 was the failure of participants who generated a kjj answer to the kji analogy to subsequently generate mrrjjk or mrrkkk answers to the mrrjjj analogy when it was solved second, despite almost all mrrjjk answers leading to kjj answers to the kji analogy when the mrrjjj analogy was solved first. But perhaps participants generating kjj as their answer to the kji analogy when it was given first were simply unmotivated, so that little can be concluded from their solutions to the second analogy. Similar ad hoc explanations of other specific transfer effects (though not the overall order effect) could be raised because what participants' did on the their first analogy was uncontrolled. To rule out such alternative explanations, in Experiment 2a a direct manipulation was made of how participants solved the first analogy. Participants were given an answer to the kji analogy and asked to justify why someone might think it was a good answer. Participants then solved the mrrjjj analogy. By manipulating the answer to the kji analogy that participants justified, it should be possible to alter the likelihood of participants producing a particular answer to the second analogy. If participants indeed exhibit meta-analogical transfer, this direct manipulation should replicate the results for the kji analogy first condition of Experiment 1.
The answer to the kji analogy that was provided to participants was either kjj or kjh. Given that the kjj answer emphasizes the mapping of "successor to successor", first justifying the kjj answer to the kji analogy should lead to more mrrjjk answers to the mrrjjj analogy than should first justifying the kjh answer. The mrrjjk answer is a clear application of the "successor to successor" mapping, but one that can ignore other aspects of the structure of the string, as does the kjj answer to the kji analogy.
Similarly, the mrrkkk answer should also become more common for participants in the justify-kjj condition, because the mrrkkk answer is still based on making the "successor to successor" mapping, even though it is a more structured answer to the mrrjjj analogy. Because the kjh answer to the kji analogy involves mappings that are difficult to transfer to the mrrjjj analogy, trying to transfer a set of mappings from the kjh answer that has no simple fit should yield a variety of answers. Therefore, an increase in rare answers (defined, as in Experiment 1, as those produced by two or fewer participants in Experiment 1) should be observed when the kjh answer was justified.
Method
Participants. There were 146 participants, 101 from the UCLA subject pool and 45 from the University of Texas, Austin subject pool. All received partial course credit for participating.
Materials and Procedure. Participants were given a two-page booklet. The kji analogy, stated in the same way as in Experiment 1, was presented on the first page. But instead of then being instructed to write down an answer to the kji analogy, participants were given the following instructions:
There are a number of possible answers to this problem. One answer that many people think is a good answer to this problem is: kjj Try to explain why someone could think that kjj is a good answer to this problem.
The above wording is for the justify-kjj condition. For the justify-kjh condition the string "kjh" was substituted for "kjj". The instructions were followed with ruled lines on which participants were to write down their justification.
On the second page of the booklet the mrrjjj analogy was presented in the identical manner as that in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
The justifications that participants gave for the kjh or kjj answer were evaluated. Almost all participants gave answers supportive of the given answer. In the justify-kjh condition only 2 out of 73 participants, and in the justify-kjj condition only 4 out of 73, gave justifications that were not supportive of the given answer. There was no evidence of differences in the amount of effort participants put into justifying each answer. This conclusion was supported by a simple count of the number of lines of text participants wrote, which showed that the mean number of lines used was not significantly different for - Table 3 about here
The answer to the mrrjjj analogy that participants produced was recorded in the same way as in Experiment 1. Table 3 is organized in a similar way to Table 2 in Experiment 1, in that it shows the proportion of participants producing the answers that were common in Experiment 1. Only one answer not listed in Table 3 was produced by more than two participants: mrrhhh, which was generated by four participants who justified kjh. For comparison, Table 3 also lists the proportions of those participants who solved the mrrjjj analogy second in Experiment 1 who generated each answer to the mrrjjj analogy, depending on whether they had generated the kjj or kjh answer to the kji analogy first. Table 3 were included in the analysis except jjjmrr, an answer nobody gave in this experiment). Thus, having participants
justify an answer appears to have a similar effect as that observed for participants who generated that answer on their own, though the small number of Experiment 1 participants who can be used in this comparison makes it hard to draw a definitive conclusion.
As predicted, the proportion of mrrjjk answers produced for the mrrjjj analogy was greater for the justify-kjj than for the justify-kjh condition, X 2 (1) = 5.84, p < .02. However, the prediction that the proportion of mrrkkk answers would be greater was not supported, X 2 (1) = .53, p > .5. However, support was found for the prediction that the proportion of 'other' answers (consisting of the same answers as those in the 'other' category in Experiment 1) would be much greater for the justify-kjh group than for the justify-kjj condition, X 2 (1) = 6.66, p < .01.
Experiment 2a showed that there was a strong influence on the mrrjjj analogy of which answer was justified for the kji analogy. The simplest application of the "successor to successor" mapping to the mrrjjj analogy, the mrrjjk answer, was generated more often after such a mapping was encouraged by first justifying the kjj answer to the kji analogy.
Although justifying the kjj answer to the kji analogy clearly affected participants' answers to the mrrjjj analogy, many justify-kjj participants (43%) produced answers other than mrrjjk or mrrkkk to the mrrjjj analogy, just as did participants in Experiment 1 who answered kjj to the kji analogy when they solved it first. This finding suggested that the participants in Experiment 1 who generated kjj as their answer to the kji analogy but subsequently did not generate mrrjjk as their answer to the mrrjjj analogy were not just unusual participants. This result therefore supports the interpretation that it is difficulty of transferring predicate mappings that accounts for the asymmetrical transfer effects in Experiment 1. Both the mrrjjk and kjj answers are based on the mapping of "successor to successor", but the mrrjjk answer appears to involve no other meaningful mappings. Accordingly, this mapping can easily be transferred to the kji analogy, as the results of Experiment 1 suggested. In contrast, the kjj answer may involve other mappings which can not be easily transferred to the mrrjjj analogy, leading to many answers being generated other than the mrrjjk or mrrkkk answers.
The kjh answer to the kji analogy is based on mappings such as "successor to predecessor" and "sequence to sequence", which can not be easily applied to the mrrjjj analogy. As predicted, justifying kjh as an answer to the kji analogy resulted in a greater variety of answers to the mrrjjj analogy than did justifying kjj.
In summary, the results of Experiment 2a lend support to the claim that predicate mappings are transferred and that they account for meta-analogical transfer.
Experiment 2b
If the order effects on the kji analogy in Experiment 1 were due to transfer from the answers participants produced to the mrrjjj analogy, then it should be possible to change the distribution of participants' answers to the kji analogy by having them justify a particular answer to the mrrjjj analogy.
For Experiment 2b a similar procedure was used as in Experiment 2a; participants justified an answer to the mrrjjj analogy that embodied a certain mapping, and then they had to generate an answer to the kji analogy. However, both of the most common answers to the mrrjjj analogy  mrrjjk and mrrkkk  would predict the same result: an increase in the frequency of kjj answers. Therefore, other answers to the mrrjjj analogy were used as well. One answer that should produce a greater number of answers based on a "sequence to sequence" mapping than would the mrrjjk or mrrkkk answers, is the mrrjjjj answer. This was produced by only one participant in Experiment 1, but Mitchell (1993) argues that it may be the most elegant answer because it requires a sequence mapping. The mrrjjjj answer maps a sequence of letters (as in abc:abd) to a sequence of numbers describing the group sizes (1-2-3 : 1-2-4).
One potential objection to comparing mrrjjjj to the mrrjjk and mrrkkk answers is that mrrjjjj is perhaps the best answer to the mrrjjj analogy. Perhaps a good answer to the mrrjjj analogy will lead to better answers to the kji analogy by somehow encouraging good answers to the kji analogy, irrespective of the mappings involved. To provide evidence that not only good answers to the mrrjjj analogy reduce the frequency of kjj answer to the kji analogy, a fourth answer to the mrrjjj analogy was also used: mrrjjd. This answer appears to be a poor one as it is based on a superficial element mapping of "d to d", and it was never generated in Experiment 1 (though one participant in Experiment 2a generated mrdjjd). However, if mappings are transferred between the analogy problems, then justifying mrrjjd should be less likely than justifying mrrjjk or mrrkkk to lead to a kjj answer to the kji analogy, as mrrjjd does not involve a mapping of "successor to successor".
Altogether, Experiment 2b had four conditions: justify-mrrjjjj, justify-mrrkkk, justify-mrrjjk, and justify-mrrjjd. If predicate mappings are being transferred then the justify-mrrjjk and justify-mrrkkk conditions should lead to more kjj answers to the kji analogy than either the justify-mrrjjjj or justifymrrjjd conditions. If the predicate mapping of "sequence to sequence" can be transferred from the mrrjjjj answer, then the justify-mrrjjjj answer should lead to more kjh and lji answers (both of which require a mapping of "sequence to sequence") to the kji analogy than any of the other three conditions.
Although only one participant gave the answer kjd to the kji analogy in Experiment 1, if the object mapping of "d to d" can be transferred then there should be a large number of kjd answers to the kji analogy in the justify-mrrjjd condition. Novick and Holyoak's (1991) study suggested that an object mapping should be strongly transferred.
Method
Participants. Three hundred and forty-three participants from the UCLA subject pool participated for partial course credit.
Materials and Procedure. Participants were given identical materials and instructions as those in
Experiment 2a, modified only to reflect the different analogies given in Experiment 2b. For the justifymrrjjjj, justify-mrrkkk, justify-mrrjjk, and justify-mrrjjd conditions, participants first justified the relevant answer to the mrrjjj analogy. All participants then generated an answer to the kji analogy.
Results and Discussion
The proportions of participants producing each answer to the kji analogy for each justification condition are presented in Table 4 . The categories of answers to the kji analogy presented are the most common answers given to this analogy in Experiment 1  kjh, kjj, and lji  as well as the kjd answer that was expected to arise in the justify-mrrjjd condition. The 'other' category contains all other responses, no single one of which was produced by more than three participants, except for the answer kjjiiii that was produced by five justify-mrrjjjj participants. Table 4 were included in the analysis except those for kjd, an answer nobody gave in these conditions).
-------------------------------------
Insert Table 4 about here
There was no theoretical reason to differentiate the justify-mrrjjk and justify-mrrkkk conditions. If justifying one of these two answers led to different transfer effects from justifying the other, then the distribution of answers to the kji analogy should vary between the two conditions. There was no difference between the justify-mrrjjk and justify-mrrkkk conditions in the proportions of participants producing answers in each of the categories (excluding kjd) in Table 4 for the kji analogy, X 2 (3) = 3.92, p > .25. Accordingly, for further analyses these two conditions were combined.
If the "successor to successor" mapping was transferred from the mrrjjj analogy to the kji analogy, then the proportion of kjj answers (which require the "successor to successor" mapping) to the kji problem should be greater after justifying the mrrkkk or mrrjjk answer (answers which also require the "successor to successor" mapping) to the mrrjjj analogy, than after justifying either of the other two answers. This prediction was supported as the proportion of justify-mrrkkk/justify-mrrjjk participants generating the kjj answer to the kji analogy was greater than the proportions generating the kjj answer in the justify-mrrjjjj condition, X 2 (1) = 45.1, p < .0001, or in the justify-mrrjjd condition, X 2 (1) = 41.2, p < .0001.
If the "sequence to sequence" mapping can be transferred, then the number of kjh answers to the kji problem should be greatest in the justify-mrrjjjj condition, as both the kjh and mrrjjjj answers require that mapping. The proportion of participants producing the kjh answer to the kji analogy was greater in the justify-mrrjjjj condition than in either the combination of justify-mrrkkk/justify-mrrjjk conditions, X 2 (1) = 8.28, p < .005, or in the justify-mrrjjd condition, X 2 (1) = 4.27, p < .05. Similarly, the proportion of participants producing the lji answer was greater for the justify-mrrjjjj condition than for the combination of the justify-mrrkkk/justify-mrrjjk conditions, X 2 (1) = 5.59, p < .02, though the difference did not reach significance for the comparison between the justify-mrrjjjj and justify-mrrjjd conditions, X 2 (1) = 3.09, p < .10. The results thus suggested that the "sequence to sequence" mapping was transferred most often in the justify-mrrjjjj condition, or at least that this condition interferes the least with forming this mapping.
While more participants in the justify-mrrjjjj condition than other conditions gave answers based on representations of the kji letter string as an alphabetic sequence, the justify-mrrjjjj condition also resulted in a greater variety of answers being produced. A larger proportion of justify-mrrjjjj participants produced 'other' answers than did those in the justify-mrrkkk/justify-mrrjjk conditions, X 2 (1) = 19.2, p < .0005. This finding suggested that it was harder to transfer the system mapping of "sequence to sequence" than the relational mapping of "successor to successor" to the kji analogy.
The large number of kjd answers produced by the justify-mrrjjd group illustrates the point made by Novick and Holyoak (1991) , that encouraging element mappings can strongly affect analogical reasoning. More generally, the results of Experiment 2b add to the evidence that predicate mappings are transferred in meta-analogies.
Experiment 3
The previous experiments have shown that transfer of predicate mappings occurred, but all the mapping transfers that have so far been demonstrated have been mappings of identical predicates (specifically, "successor to successor", "sequence to sequence"). In order to establish the generality of transfer of predicate mappings in meta-analogies, it is necessary to demonstrate transfer of mappings of non-identical predicates. Experiment 3 examined transfer of the mapping of the non-identical predicates "successor to predecessor", the basis of the kjh answer to the kji analogy.
Testing for transfer of the predicate mapping "successor to predecessor" required an analogy other than the kji analogy that had a frequent solution based on a "successor to predecessor" mapping. Such an analogy is the xyz analogy: "If abc becomes abd, how would you change xyz in the same way?" Mitchell (1993, pp. 82-83) reported giving the xyz analogy to participants and finding that virtually all participants gave the solution xya, which assumes that the alphabet can be considered circular (an assumption that Copycat does not make). When then asked to generate another solution, the most common answers were xyz, xyy, and xyd. Burns (1994, Exp. 4) gave participants the xyz analogy (with the xya answer prohibited) and found that the most common answers were wyz (19% of participants), xyd (15%) and wxz (8%), when the xyz analogy was solved before any other. The wyz answer appears to be based on a "successor to predecessor" mapping as well as mapping "first to last".
The xyd answer appears to be based on participants making an object mapping, "d to d", probably because they find no other solution satisfactory. The xyz analogy therefore appears to have exactly the properties required to look for transfer of a "successor to predecessor" mapping, as this mapping is the basis of plausible answers, yet the xyz analogy is otherwise quite different from the kji analogy.
One difficulty with using the xyz analogy is that the variety of answers generated in Burns (1994, Exp. 4 ) was large and even the most common answer (wyz) was only produced by 19% of participants.
This diffusion of the frequency of answers raised issues regarding how to group the answers together as representatives of a given mapping. To avoid the necessity to arbitrarily group answers, it was decided to use a rating task for this analogy, rather than a generate task. A rating task is similar to the generate task used in Experiment 1 in that the analogy is described in the same way: "If abc was changed into abd how would you change kji in the same way?" But rather than generating an answer to the analogy, participants rate how good they think is each member of a set of answers. Burns (1994, Exp. 3) had participants rate how good the answers kjj and kjh were as answers to the kji problem, either before or after they had generated an answer to the mrrjjj analogy. The ratings showed the same reversal of preferences for answers to the kji analogy as when answers were generated for the kji analogy in Experiment 1. That is, when answers to the kji analogy were rated first, the kjh answer was rated more highly (M = 4.75, on a seven point scale) than the kjj answer (M = 3.49), but when answers to the kji analogy were rated after an answer to the mrrjjj analogy had been generated, the kjj answer (M = 5.01) was rated more highly than the kjh answer (M = 3.71). The similarity of the pattern of results for the two tasks suggested that it is legitimate to generalize from a rating task to a generate task. In addition, the rating task offers the advantage that the range of participants' answers can be restricted.
In Experiment 3 participants rated wyz and xyd as answers to the xyz analogy, or rated kjj and kjh as answers to the kji analogy. These two pairs were chosen because each member of each pair was among the most common answers to their analogies, yet they embody quite different mappings.
However, one of each pair involved a "successor to predecessor" mapping. Before rating a pair of answers to either the xyz or kji analogies, participants justified an answer to the other analogy problem as they had done in Experiments 2a and 2b; this answer either would or would not provide the basis for the potential transfer of the "successor to predecessor" mapping. If they were to rate the answers to the xyz analogy, then they first justified the kjh or kjj answer to the kji analogy. If they were to rate the answers to the kji analogy, then they first justified the wyz or xyd answer to the xyz analogy. A control condition was included in which participants completed no justification, but instead rated first the two answers to the kji analogy and then the two answers to the xyz analogy, or vice versa. If there is transfer of the "successor to predecessor" mapping, then the wyz answer to the xyz analogy should be rated more highly after justifying kjh than after kjj is justified as an answer to the kji analogy. Similarly, the kjh answer to the kji analogy should be rated more highly after justifying wyz than after justifying xyd as an answer to the xyz analogy.
Method
Participants. There were 497 participants, 447 from the UCLA subject pool and 50 from the University of Texas, Austin subject pool.
Materials and Procedure. Participants were given a two-page booklet consisting of a justification task on the first page and a rating task on the second page. Each participant received both the kji and xyz analogies, one as a justification task, and one as a rating task. The justification task was identical in format to the justification task used in Experiments 2a and 2b, in that participants were asked to write down a justification for one of the two answers to either the kji (kjh or kjj) or the xyz (wyz or xyd)
analogy. The xyz analogy description explicitly excluded the xya answer as the instructions stated, "Do not assume that the alphabet is circular, therefore the answer xya would make no sense." For the rating tasks on the second page of the booklet, participants rated the goodness of the two answers to either the kji (kjh and kjj) or xyz analogy (wyz or kjd). For the kji analogy there appeared on the page the following instructions:
Below you are presented with two possible answers to the following question:
Suppose that the letter string abc was changed to abd; how would you change the letter string kji in "the same way"?
Please consider the listed answers and rate each by circling a number on the seven-point scale below it. Your rating should correspond to how good you think the answer is. On the scale the higher the rating, the better an answer you consider that string to be.
The two possible answers for the kji analogy (kjh, kjj) were then presented below each other, each with a seven-point scale next to it. The kjj answer was always on top and it was then followed by the kjh answer (Burns, 1994 , found no effect of the order of answers). The description of the rating task was similar, except that the answers xyd and wyz were rated as answers to the xyz analogy, with the xyd answer always on top.
In the control conditions participants rated answers to either the xyz or kji analogy on the first page, and then rated the answers to the other analogy on the second page. (No analysis of the second ratings will be presented as results could only be correlational) Thus there were six conditions in all.
Participants were given the booklet as part of a packet of short experiments and surveys. Each participant randomly received a booklet for one of the six conditions.
Results and Discussion
Three participants were excluded from the analysis because they did not rate all of the answers.
The mean ratings given by participants for answers to the xyz analogy (wyz and xyd) for the justifykjh group (83 participants), the justify-kjj group (80 participants) or the no-justification group (80 participants) are presented in Table 5 . If there is transfer from the kjh answer for the kji analogy, then the ratings for the wyz answer to the xyz analogy should be highest in the justify-kjh condition. For wyz ratings, a one-way ANOVA found a significant difference between justification groups, F(2,246) = 3.90, p < .05 (MS e = 4.11). A Newman-Keuls post-hoc test showed that the wyz ratings for the justify-kjh group were significantly higher than those for the justify-kjj groups. As predicted, justifying the kjh answer led to higher ratings of the wyz answer which uses the same "successor to predecessor" mapping. Neither justification group produced ratings significantly different from those of the nojustification group.
For xyd ratings a one-way ANOVA found no significant difference between justification groups, F(2,246) = .445 (MS e = 4.94). This lack of an effect on the xyd rating may be because neither justifying the kjh nor the kjj answers to the kji analogy involved making an object mapping that could be transferred to the xyd answer. Tables 5 and 6 about here Table 6 gives the mean ratings by participants of answers to the kji analogy (kjh and kjj) for the justify-wyz group (81 participants), the justify-xyd group (84 participants), or the no-justification group (86 participants). If there is transfer from the wyz answer for the xyz analogy, then the ratings for the kjh answer to the kji analogy should be highest in the justify-wyz condition. For the kjh ratings a oneway ANOVA found a significant difference between justification groups, F(2,242) = 3.78, p < .05
(MS e = 3.97). A Newman-Keuls post-hoc test showed that the kjh ratings for the justify-wyz group were significantly higher than those for either the justify-xyd or no-justification groups. Again, as predicted, justifying an answer that used the "successor to predecessor" mapping (wyz) resulted in higher ratings of an answer that used the same mapping (kjh) than when an answer was justified that did not require this mapping (xyd).
For kjj ratings a one-way ANOVA also revealed a significant difference between justification groups, F(2,242) = 3.04, p < .05 (MS e = 4.13). A Newman-Keuls post-hoc test showed that the nojustification group gave higher ratings to the kjj answer than did the justify-wyz group, although not significantly greater than the justify-xyd group. Thus it appears that justifying either answer to the xyz analogy suppressed kjj ratings. This result is in contrast to those obtained with the mrrjjj analogy in Experiments 1 and 2b, which when solved first promoted subsequent kjj answers to the kji analogy.
The increased favorability of the kjj answer to the kji analogy in earlier experiments was thus not simply a product of doing just any analogy first; rather, it only occurred when the first analogy was likely to promote the formation of the mapping of "successor to successor".
The results of Experiment 3 supported the claim that mapping of non-identical predicates ("successor to predecessor") can be transferred. Ratings of answers based on this mapping -kjh or wyz for the relevant analogy -were increased by having participants justify an answer that used the "successor to predecessor" mapping. It might be suggested that some other mapping is being transferred between the wyz and kjh answers, as they have another common mapping, "ascending (sequence) to descending (sequence)". However, this is also a mapping of non-identical predicates.
Thus whichever mapping or mappings are being transferred, the results support the claim that nonidentical mappings can be transferred between analogical reasoning episodes.
General Discussion
These experiments demonstrated the existence of meta-analogical transfer, as the analogical relationship formed in solving one problem can itself be transferred to a new episode of analogical reasoning. The experiments reported here provided strong evidence that the medium of meta-analogical transfer is the predicate mappings made during the first episode of analogical reasoning, These predicate mappings were transferred to a second episode of analogical reasoning in which they were used to solve a new analogy problem. A form of learning thus results from solving analogies.
Clear transfer phenomena were observed. Experiment 1 provided evidence of more uniform transfer from one analogy problem (mrrjjj) to a more structured analogy problem (kji), than when the order of presentation was reversed. When answers to the kji analogy were generated, kjh was generally preferred over kjj as an answer; this pattern was reversed if the kji analogy was solved after the mrrjjj analogy had been solved. Thus there appeared to be transfer of the mappings of "successor to successor", which should be part of most answers to the mrrjjj analogy as well as the kjj answer to the kji analogy. Transfer also appeared to occur from the kji analogy to the mrrjjj analogy, but the transfer was less uniform in that the diversity of answers increased when the mrrjjj analogy was solved second.
Experiments 2a and 2b reinforced these findings by showing that transfer also occurred when participants' mappings were directly manipulated by having participants justify a pre-determined answer to the first analogy. Experiment 3 demonstrated that mappings of non-identical predicates such as "successor to predecessor" can be transferred. These experiments do not provide direct evidence that participants were transferring mappings (for example, no verbal protocols were collected from participants); however, the consistency of the influence of prior solutions on new problems makes a strong argument that transfer of predicate mappings occurs.
While Experiment 3 generalized the finding of meta-analogical transfer to different predicate mappings and different letter-string analogies, the present study did not demonstrate that these results will generalize to other types of meta-analogies. If meta-analogical transfer occurs it provides evidence about what kinds of relationships can be transferred. It has been argued that abstract analogical relations cannot be transferred (Detterman, 1993) . But the current experiments appear to show that participants are sensitive to abstract similarity, at the level of the similarity of analogical mappings, even when the mappings are of non-identical predicates. In the current experiments, transfer was not tested across different types of situations. For example, no attempt was made to investigate if forming the "Dennis Thatcher" analogy could affect solutions to letter-string analogies. Whether such transfer can occur has been an important issue in analogical reasoning (see Detterman, 1993) , so a future challenge is to determine if meta-analogical transfer can occur across different types of situations. Another issue raised by Detterman is whether analogical transfer is spontaneous. Although participants in these experiments were not required to use the solution from the first episode in the second episode, the fact they immediately followed each other makes it unlikely that the transfer was spontaneous. Thus determining whether meta-analogical transfer can be spontaneous is other potential challenge for future research.
While the emphasis of this paper has been on relational predicate mappings, this is not meant to imply that transfer of object mappings does not occur. In fact, these experiments yielded many examples of transfer of element mappings. In particular, strong evidence of transfer of the object mapping "d to d" was provided by the finding from Experiment 2b of a large number of kjd answers to the kji analogy after the mrrjjd answer to the mrrjjj analogy was justified. However, it is disputable whether answers based purely on an object mapping constitute analogy. Gentner (1989) characterizes comparisons between a source and target that are based on object mappings as mere-appearance matches.
Gentner contrasts such matches with analogies, which are defined as being based on mappings of predicates that express a relation between their arguments. Because answers to letter-string problems based on object mappings may not constitute analogies by some theoretical criterion, it would be problematic to consider transfer based solely on object mappings to be evidence of meta-analogical transfer.
Implication for Computational Models
These demonstrations of transfer of mappings between analogical reasoning episodes indicate that such episodes are not isolated; the solution of future analogy problems can be influenced by a previous analogy problem even when the two sets of problems are not isomorphic. Such meta-analogies are not dealt with by current computational models of analogical mapping, such as Copycat (Mitchell, 1993) , ACME (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989) or SME (Falkenhainer, et al. 1989) , nor by models of analogical retrieval, such as ARCS (Thagard, Holyoak, Nelson, & Gochfeld, 1990) and MAC/FAC (Gentner, Forbus, & Law, 1995) . Broadly, the present experiments offer some support for these models by reinforcing the claim that predicate mappings are being formed when analogies are made. The importance of such mappings is a critical assumption in these models. While the above models currently deal only with single episodes of analogical reasoning, it may be possible to extend them to deal with transfer between multiple episodes. Hofstadter (1995) has recognized this challenge and explicitly sets out the processing of meta-analogies as an aim of future models of analogy that go beyond Copycat.
All of the above models in some way propose that mappings are the basis of analogical reasoning; thus transfer could possibly be incorporated into these models by having the mappings produced during the solution of previous analogy problems bias the mappings formed during new episodes. How such biasing could be achieved would depend on the details of each individual model. For example, in ACME either the activations of mappings from previous analogies could become the initial values of corresponding mappings for new analogies, or these mappings could receive external activation during the new analogical reasoning episode.
Implications for Asymmetries of Transfer
Experiment 1 found asymmetrical transfer between the kji and mrrjjj analogy problem-solving episodes. A number of studies have suggested that asymmetries exist in analogical transfer (Bassok, 1990; Bassok & Holyoak, 1989 Reed, Ackinclose, & Voss, 1990; Reed, Ernst, & Banerji, 1974; Reed & Evans, 1987) , though none deal with meta-analogical transfer. While the current experiments do not reveal why asymmetries in transfer occur, they lead to some hypotheses.
The kji and mrrjjj analogies differ in a potentially interesting way, as they contrast a relatively unstructured analogy (mrrjjj) with a more structured one (kji). It is possible to produce highly structured answers to the kji analogy based on mapping the predicate "sequence" from the representation of the abc string to the "sequence" predicate in the representation of the kji string, which in Halford's (1987) terms is a more complex system mapping than the relational mappings on which most mrrjjj answers are based (e.g., "successor to successor" is a relational mapping). But for the mrrjjj analogy it is hard to use predicates to link all parts of the strings together. or to use a system mappings used (except for the mrrjjjj answer). Because of the greater amount of structure, Copycat produces answers with more structure for the kji analogy than for the mrrjjj analogy (Mitchell, 1993) .
If the kji and mrrjjj analogies contrast in terms of the amount of structure their answers tend to have, then they will differ in that more predicates will tend to be required to represent answers to the kji analogy than to represent answers to the mrrjjj analogy. The sheer number of predicates in a representation is almost certainly not the only issue -higher-order predicates are probably particularly important -but how these factors may interact remains unclear. Asymmetries in numbers of predicates may lead to asymmetries of transfer because it may be more important for the source to fit the target, than vice-versa. The problem solver may focus more on using the source knowledge they already have to make inferences about the target they are trying to interpret. That analogies involve using the source to understand a target is illustrated by the comparison, "Some butchers are surgeons", as opposed to "Some surgeons are butchers". As Glucksberg, Gildea, and Bookin (1982) pointed out, the former appears to be saying something nice about the target (butchers), while the later is unflattering to the target (surgeons).
How might the number of predicates lead to asymmetries of transfer? For an analogical solution to be transferred from a source to a target domain an appropriate mapping is required. Yet it is probably rare that only one set of predicate mappings exists between complex domains. Mapping therefore becomes partly a selection problem, as people must settle on one of several alternative mappings.
When transferring from a domain with relatively few predicates in its representation, to a domain with a representation requiring a larger number of predicates, there may be only a limited number of ways to fit the source to the target domain, if it is assumed that participants focus on how to fit an already understood source domain to a target domain, rather than vice versa. But when the mapping is many-to-one, as it is when there are relatively more predicates in the source than the target representation, participants must discard some predicates, even though they may have relatively little basis for how to judge which are the appropriate predicates to focus on and try to map. Hence, different participants will resolve this many-to-one mapping problem in different ways, resulting in some hitting upon the mappings that lead to one solution (which may or may not be correct by some external criteria), whereas others select mappings that lead to other solutions (correct or incorrect). Thus asymmetries in the number of predicates used to represent analogies may lead to asymmetries of transfer. The evidence from letter-string analogies supports this interpretation by demonstrating that even when participants do not produce the common solutions, they still appear to be producing answers to the second problem that are the result of transfer from the first problem. The heterogeneity of the answers is greatest when transferring from the analogy problem with the most structure (the kji analogy). As
Gentner and Bowdle (1994) point out, unmapped structure can provide the basis for inferences.
However, if these inferences are unconstrained then they may lead to a variety of different answers.
Representation and Meta-analogy
To be a good meta-analogy, transfer of more than a single predicate mapping may be necessary. In addition, the relation between mappings may be transferred. Thus Hofstadter's "shield tortoise" to "feather-cow" meta-analogy may be a better meta-analogy than "Dennis Thatcher" to "Marie Curie".
The later may only require transfer of the mapping of "man to women", but Hofstadter's meta-analogy requires transferring the relationship between the mappings, that one is good ("shield to tortoise shell") and one is poor ("toad to tortoise body"). In this paper only the transfer of predicate mappings has been clearly demonstrated, but the asymmetries of transfer are suggestive that more than a single mapping is being transferred. It is tempting to speculate that the complete representation of a letterstring analogy includes the relationship between mappings (e.g., that "successor to predecessor" and "ascending to descending" mappings for the kjh answer to the kji problem are linked by the "opposite" relationship), and that such relationships are transferred.
In general, the results of the present study emphasize the importance of understanding the structures people build to represent analogies in order to understand transfer. Transfer to a new problem occurred through the first episode biasing the predicate mappings (which constitute the representation) in the second episode. Thus the representation of the analogies were not fixed by their content. The idea that building representations interacts with the way analogies are solved has been advanced recently by others, particularly in Hofstadter and Mitchell's work (e.g., Hofstadter, 1995; Mitchell, 1993) . Ross and Bradshaw (1994) have emphasized the importance of representation in analogical reasoning, speculating that reminding, mapping, and transfer, may interact dynamically during encoding. Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner (1993) have argued that similarity comparisons interact with the process of building representations of the objects being compared. The results reported here suggest that participants transfer more than simple rules, even when a simple rule would fit perfectly well. They instead appear to form elaborate representations and they fit such representations to the target domain (explicitly or implicitly), even when the fit is poor or under-constrained. The clarity of the representations of letter-string analogies may make them especially useful for investigating the role of representation in analogical and meta-analogical transfer. In general, these experiments demonstrated that letter-string analogies can be a useful tool for addressing a range of issues in analogical reasoning.
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